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COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR LICENSING IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY: SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
DOCTRINE PREVENTS EGREGIOUS RESULTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Licensing is a method of regulating various professions, occupa-
tions, and businesses.' Licensing laws are usually enacted to protect
the public and often require a person acting in a particular capacity
to fulfill certain requirements.' By fulfilling specific requirements, a
0 1988 by Michael J. Smith
1. It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss the general topic of licensing. For
background information concerning this topic, several sources are helpful. See generally 53
C.J.S. Licenses §§ 1-102 (1987); see also 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits §§ 1-87
(1970).
Any discussion of licenses and licensing should include a definition of the terms "license"
and "licensing." The federal Administrative Procedure Act offers definitions. Of these terms,
section 551(8) defines "license" as "the whole or a part of an agency permit, certificate, ap-
proval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission." 5
U.S.C. § 551(8) (1982). And section 551(9) defines "licensing" as the "process respecting the
grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment,
modification, or conditioning of a license." 5 U.S.C. § 551(9) (1982). In Blatz Brewing Co. v.
Collins, the court defined a license as "a grant of permission to do a particular thing, to
exercise a certain privilege, or to carry on a particular business or to pursue a certain occupa-
tion." 69 Cal. App. 2d 639, 643, 160 P.2d 37, 39 (1945) (citing San Francisco v. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co., 166 Cal. 244, 249, 135 P. 971, 974 (1913)).
2. For example, in California, individuals in the following professions, occupations, and
businesses must be licensed: Accountants, architects, certain athletes, barbers, behavioral sci-
ence workers, contractors, cosmetologists, dentists, embalmers, engineers, funeral directors, ge-
ologists, landscape architects, medical examiners (includes physicians and surgeons, podiatrists,
physical therapists), nurses, nursing home administrators, optometrists, pharmacists, private
investigators, shorthand reporters, and veterinarians. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, CALIFORNIA
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 182-83 (27th ed. 1976).
Important to this comment is California Business and Professions Code section 7068(a),
which requires contractors to be licensed. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
The board (the Contractors State License Board) shall require an applicant to
show such degree of knowledge and experience in the classification applied for,
and such general knowledge of the building, safety, health, and lien laws of the
state and of the administrative principles of the contracting business as the
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person demonstrates a minimal level of competency, honesty, and fi-
nancial capacity. The failure to fulfill the requirements may result in
courts refusing to enforce a contract between the improperly licensed
person and the other contracting party.'
California Business and Professions Code section 7031 is part
of the Contractors License Law." Under section 7031, a building
board deems necessary for the safety and protection of the public.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7068 (West Supp. 1988).
3. For information on how the lack of a license may affect the enforceability of a con-
tract in the context of the construction industry, see Annotation, Failure of Building and
Construction Artisan or Contractor to Procure Business or Occupational License as Affecting
Enforceability of Contract or Right of Recovery for Work Done, Modern Cases, 44 A.L.R. 4th
271 (1986).
In addition to not having a contract enforced, contractors and subcontractors in California
cannot maintain an action to foreclose a mechanics' lien unless they can allege and prove that
they satisfied the requisite licensing requirements. M. MARSH, CALIFORNIA MECHANICS'
LIEN LAW AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY PRACTICE 10-17 (4th ed. 1985 & Supp. 1987).
4. The Contractors License Law is a comprehensive scheme governing contractors who
conduct business in California. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7000-7173 (West 1975 & Supp.
1988). The law is administered by the Contractors State License Board [hereinafter the CSLB]
which is a part of the California Department of Consumer Affairs. The CSLB license board
licenses and regulates contractors in the various trades which compose the construction indus-
try. CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD, CALIFORNIA CONTRACTORS LICENSE LAW &
REFERENCE BOOK (25th ed. 1984).
The term "contractor" is defined by California Business and Professions Code section
7026 and provides:
The term contractor for the purposes of this chapter is synonymous with the
term 'builder' and, within the meaning of this chapter, a contractor is any per-
son, who undertakes to or offers to undertake to or purports to have the capacity
to undertake to or submits a bid to, or does himself or by or through others,
construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move, wreck or demolish
any building, highway, road, parking facility, railroad, excavation or other
structure, project, development or improvement, or to do any part thereof, in-
cluding the erection of scaffolding or other structures or works in connection
therewith, or the cleaning of grounds or structures in connection therewith, and
whether or not the performance of work herein described involves the addition
to or fabrication 'into any structure, project, development or improvement herein
described of any material or article of merchandise. The term contractor in-
cludes subcontractor and specialty contractor.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7026 (West Supp. 1988).
The CSLB issues licenses for the three following classifications: (1) Class "A"--general
engineering contractor, (2) Class "B"--general building contractor, and (3) Class "C"--spe-
cialty contractor. CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD, CALIFORNIA CONTRACTORS LI-
CENSE LAW & REFERENCE BOOK 5 (25th ed. 1984). Licensing requirements vary, depending
upon which license is sought.
Moreover, California statutes define the terms "general building contractor" and "spe-
cialty contractor." California Business and Professions Code section 7057 provides:
A general building contractor is a contractor whose principal contracting busi-
ness is in connection with any structure built, being built, or to be built, for the
support, shelter and enclosure of persons, animals, chattels or movable property
of any kind, requiring in its construction the use of more than two unrelated
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contractor is prohibited from bringing or maintaining an action in
any court for the collection of sums owed for contracting services
unless the contractor is properly licensed at all times during the per-
formance of a job.' An unlicensed or improperly licensed contractor
will not be allowed access to the courts to recover for labor and/or
materials furnished to another party.6 The contractor who is not
properly licensed at all times during the performance of a job runs
the risk of not being paid for work completed.
California courts have stated that section 7031 serves two im-
portant purposes. First, the statute serves to protect the public
against the dishonest, incompetent, inexperienced, financially irre-
building trades or crafts, or to do or superintend the whole or any part thereof.
This does not include anyone who merely furnishes materials or supplies under
Section 7045 without fabricating them into, or consuming them in the perform-
ance of the work of the general contractor.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7057 (West 1975).
California Business and Professions Code section 7058(a) provides: "A specialty contrac-
tor is a contractor whose operations as such are the performance of construction work requir-
ing special skills and whose principal contracting business involves the use of specialized build-
ing trades or crafts." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7058(a) (West Supp. 1988).
Furthermore, the California Administrative Code provides that "specialty contractors" are
classified into over 35 subclassifications. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 830-834 (1986).
5. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West 1975). This statute is the focus of this
comment. The complete text of the statute is found in the background section of this comment.
For a brief but excellent general discussion of some basic problems with contractor licens-
ing, see J. SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE CONSTRUC-
TION PROCESS (3d ed. 1985). The author draws attention to some of the problems associated
with the licensing of contractors. Specifically, contractor licensing laws can artificially reduce
the pool of contractors. Also, the segregation of specialty trades by licensing tends to reduce the
likelihood of more efficient organizational structures, something especially needed in the con-
struction industry. It is common for contractors licenses to be "bought" and "sold" as any
other valuable commodity. Finally, the issuance of a license can be a false representation by
the state that may deceive the unwary consumer, therefore, harming persons whom the law
was intended to protect. Id. at 423.
6. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West 1975). In addition to being denied access to
the courts, unlicensed contractors may face other problems. For example, California Business
and Professions Code section 7028 provides that any person who engages in the business or
acts in the capacity of a contractor in California without the proper license may face civil and
criminal penalties. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7028 (West Supp. 1988).
Also, California Business and Professions Code section 7028.3 provides that a superior
court may restrain an unlicensed contractor from acting in the capacity of a contractor by
granting a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, or a permanent injunction
under appropriate circumstances. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7028.3 (West Supp. 1988).
The Contractors State License Board has the power to have unlicensed contractors' tele-
phones disconnected if they have advertised in the yellow pages in the phone book. Under a
pilot program in Sacramento County, computerized license information is updated daily and is
made available to local building departments. If a builder tries to obtain a permit and is unli-
censed, or if the license is not in good standing, the permit may be denied. San Jose Mercury
News, Oct. 3, 1987, at DI, col. 1.
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sponsible and fraudulent acts of building contractors and persons
acting in the capacity of building contractors.7 Second, the statute
serves to practically enforce the Contractors License Law.8 Califor-
7. Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 239 Cal. App. 2d 664, 48 Cal. Rptr.
901 (1966). The court stated: "The purpose of the law is to protect the public in California
against incompetent and dishonest persons who do, or offer, undertake or contract to do, build-
ing in this state or represent that they have the capacity for such work in California." Id. at
678-79, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 911. See also Asdourian v. Araj, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 282, 696 P.2d 95,
98, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703, 706 (1985); Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 149-
50, 308 P.2d 713, 718 (1957); Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, 27 Cal. 2d 687, 690, 166 P.2d
265, 266 (1946); Knapp Dev. & Design v. Pal-Mal Properties, Ltd., 173 Cal. App. 3d 423,
430, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47 (1985); Gaines v. Eastern Pac., 136 Cal. App. 3d 679, 682, 186
Cal. Rptr. 421, 423 (1982); Roy Bros. Drilling Co. v. Jones, 123 Cal. App. 3d 175, 183, 176
Cal. Rptr. 449, 453 (1981); Brown v. Solano County Business Dev., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 3d
192, 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. 700, 702 (1979); Airfloor Co. of Cal. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 84
Cal. App. 3d 1004, 1010, 149 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1978); Rushing v. Powell, 61 Cal. App. 3d
597, 604-05, 130 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114-15 (1976); Weeks v. Merritt Bldg. & Constr. Co., 39
Cal. App. 3d 520, 524, 114 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212 (1974); Vitek Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace,
Inc., 34 Cal. App. 3d 586, 594, 110 Cal. Rptr. 86, 92 (1973); General Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 176, 183, 102 Cal. Rptr. 541, 546 (1972); Davis Co. v.
Superior Court, 1 Cal. App. 3d 156, 158, 81 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455 (1969); Jackson v. Pancake,
266 Cal. App. 2d 307, 309-10, 72 Cal. Rptr. 111, 113 (1968); Steinbrenner v. J.A. Waterbury
Constr. Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 661, 666, 28 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207 (1963); Bierman v. Hagstrom
Constr. Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 771, 775, 1 Cal. Rptr. 826, 829 (1959) (quoting Howard v.
State, 85 Cal. App. 2d 361, 365, 193 P.2d 11, 13 (1948)); Grant v. Weatherholt, 123 Cal.
App. 2d 34, 43, 266 P.2d 185, 192 (1954).
The Arizona Supreme Court, in passing upon a contractor license law, stated that the law
was designed to:
[P]revent unscrupulous or financially irresponsible contractors from deceiving
and taking advantage of those who engage them to build. . . .It often happens
that fly-by-night organizations begin a job and, standing in the danger of losing
money, leave it unfinished to the owner's detriment. Or they may do unsatisfac-
tory work, failing to comply with the terms of the agreement. The licensing
requirement is designed to curb these evils; the license itself is some evidence to
the owner that he is dealing with an honest and qualified builder.
Sobel v. Jones, 96 Ariz. 297, 300-01, 394 P.2d 415, 417 (1964).
8. General Ins., 26 Cal. App. 3d 176, 102 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1972). The court stated:
"There is however, a more immediate and specific purpose to [section 7031]. That purpose is
the practical enforcement of the Contractors License Law." Id. at 183-84, 102 Cal. Rptr. at
546. See also Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1985). The court
stated: "Section 7031 has as its purpose the enforcement of the Contractors License Law." Id.
at 282, 696 P.2d at 98, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 706; Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 278,
291-92, 411 P.2d 564, 574, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676, 686 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Lewis &
Queen, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 151, 308 P.2d 713, 719 (1957); Knapp, 173 Cal. App. 3d 423, 430,
219 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47 (1985) (citing Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 282, 696 P.2d 95, 98, 211
Cal. Rptr. 703, 706 (1985)); Brown, 92 Cal. App. 3d 192, 154 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1979). The
Brown court stated: "As the courts have pointed out, by enacting section 7031 the Legislature
has manifested its determination that the misdemeanor penalties otherwise provided for con-
tracting without a license constitute insufficient deterrent to prevent the conduct prohibited."
Id. at 198, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 703; Weeks, 39 Cal. App. 3d 520, 524, 114 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212
(1974); Vitek, 34 Cal. App. 3d 586, 110 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1973). The court stated: "Clearly the
licensing provision is designed to protect the administration of the licensing law as well as to
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nia courts have, at times, insisted on strict compliance with section
7031. However, as the harshness of requiring strict compliance be-
came apparent, California courts adopted the substantial compliance
doctrine.' °
In the landmark decision Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court," the
California Supreme Court established the test for determining sub-
stantial compliance. The test is whether a contractor's "substantial
compliance with the licensing requirements satisfies the policy of the
protect the public from incompetent and untrustworthy artisans." Id. at 594, 110 Cal. Rptr. at
92; Frank v. Kozlovsky, 13 Cal. App. 3d 120, 125-26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (1970).
9. Lewis & Queen, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957). This case is often cited as
advocating the strict compliance approach to section 7031. The court rejected the contractor's
contention that recovery should be allowed on his construction contract even though he had not
strictly complied with section 7031 on the grounds that a recovery would prevent unjust en-
richment. Instead, the court enforced a literal interpretation of section 7031 stating that "the
Legislature was as much concerned to protect the public from dishonesty and incompetence in
the administration of the contracting business as in the actual use of bricks, mortar, and the
earth-moving equipment." Id. at 149-50, 308 P.2d at 718-19.
10. Citizens State Bank of Long Beach v. Gentry, 20 Cal. App. 2d 415, 67 P.2d 364
(1937). This is considered one of the first cases to apply the doctrine of substantial compliance
to section 7031.
11. 64 Cal. 2d 278, 411 P.2d 564, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1966). This case is discussed
throughout this comment. California has not been the only state to adopt a substantial compli-
ance doctrine with respect to contractor licensing laws; the state of Washington has also em-
ployed this doctrine. In its leading case, Murphy v. Campbell Inv. Co., the Supreme Court of
Washington, sitting en banc, concluded that a contractor who inadvertently forgot to accom-
pany his application for a license with proof that he had liability insurance, and later corrected
his mistake, substantially complied with the state's licensing statute. 79 Wash. 2d 417, 486
P.2d 1080 (1971). The court noted that the intent or design of the statute is to prevent the
victimizing of a defenseless public by unreliable, fraudulent, and incompetent contractors. Id.
at 421, 486 P.2d at 1083 (quoting Stewart v. Hammond, 78 Wash. 2d 216, 219, 471 P.2d 90,
92 (1970)). Washington state has several cases in which substantial compliance is found. See,
e.g., Northwest Cascade Constr. Inc. v. Custom Component Structures, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 453,
519 P.2d 1 (1974) (Substantial compliance with Washington's licensing law was found on the
part of a subcontractor's employees who completed a building contract even when the subcon-
tractor took on another job because the contractor remained obligated under the original con-
tract and remained sufficiently involved in the construction contract.); Expert Drywall, Inc. v.
Brain, 17 Wash. App. 529, 564 P.2d 803 (1977) (Substantial compliance was found where a
general contractor's license had lapsed for a three month time period. A variety of errors made
by the general contractor, an insurance and bonding company, and by state registration offi-
cials caused the lapse.).
In addition, several other states have case law in which a contractor's licensing law was
not strictly interpreted. In Arizona, for example, Desert Springs Mobile Home Ranches, Inc.
v. John H. Wood Constr. Co. held that the statutory requirement was satisfied where the
president of a construction company was individually licensed even though the license of the
company itself had been suspended during the performance of the contract and no attempt was
made to remove the suspension. 15 Ariz. App. 193, 487 P.2d 414 (1971). Nevada's statute was
interpreted in a manner which allowed the contractor to recover despite non-strict compliance.
See MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Imperial Glass Co., 533 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 887 (1976).
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statute. '"12 Moreover, the court summarized three factual elements
that must be present in order to warrant the application of the sub-
stantial compliance doctrine:
(1) the fact that the plaintiff held a valid license at the time of
contracting, (2) that the plaintiff readily secured a renewal of
that license, and (3) that the responsibility and competence of
plaintiff's managing officer were officially confirmed throughout
the period of performance of the contract. 3
Recent cases have raised the question of whether the satisfaction
of all three Latipac elements are necessary in order to find substan-
tial compliance. The California Supreme Court has stated that "the
failure to establish all of the Latipac elements need not defeat a
plaintiff's claim ... [because the real test is whether] the contrac-
tor's substantial compliance with the licensing requirements satisfies
the policy of the statute." 4 Moreover, commentators suggest that the
courts appear to be relaxing the stringency of the elements necessary
for a finding of substantial compliance. 5
This comment suggests that the three element Latipac test
should be modified, and proposes a two part test to determine
whether a contractor has substantially complied with section 7031.
Part II of this comment discusses the background and development
of the doctrine of substantial compliance. Part III discusses the
problems associated with using the Latipac elements to determine
whether there has been substantial compliance with section 7031.
Part IV analyzes its application by the California courts. Finally,
Part V outlines the proposed two element test to determine whether
a contractor has substantially complied with section 7031.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Text of Section 7031
California Business and Professions Code section 7031 provides
in its present form:
12. Latipac, 64 Cal. 2d at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (citing Lewis, 48
Cal. 2d at 149, 308 P.2d at 718).
13. Id. at 281-82, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
14. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1985). The court
stated: "If the facts clearly indicate substantial compliance which satisfies the policy of the
Contractors License Law, the failure to establish all the Latipac factors should not defeat
plaintiff's claim." Id. at 284, 696 P.2d at 100, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
15. J. ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL (3d ed. 1982 & Supp.
1987). The author states: "The courts appear to be relaxing the stringency of the requirements
for a finding of substantial compliance with the Contractors License Law." Id. at 28.
[Vol. 28
1988] SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a
contractor, may bring or maintain any action in any court of
this state for the collection of compensation for the performance
of any act or contract for which a license is required by this
chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly li-
censed contractor at all times during the performance of such
act or contract, except that such prohibition shall not apply to
contractors who are each individually licensed under this chap-
ter but who fail to comply with Section 7029.16
B. Purpose of Section 7031
California courts have noted that the primary intent of the Leg-
islature in enacting section 7031 was to protect the health, safety,
and general welfare of members of the public who deal with contrac-
tors or persons acting as contractors.17 The statute is supposed to
protect the public against incompetent, inexperienced and unquali-
fied individuals acting as contractors.1 8 The statute attempts to ac-
16. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West 1975). California Business and Professions
Code section 7031, as enacted in 1939, read as follows:
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may
bring or maintain any action in any court of this State for the collection of
compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly li-
censed contractor at all times during the performance of such act or contract.
(ch. 37, § 1, Stat. 384 (1939)).
In 1957, the statute contained the same text as the 1939 statute but was amended to
include the following provision:
Until the expiration of six months from the date of a suspension of a license
pursuant to section 7068, the provisions of this section do not apply to any
person whose license was suspended pursuant to Section 7068 for failure to
notify the registrar within the 10-day period, if such failure was due to
inadvertence.
(ch. 845, § 1, Stat. 2067 (1957)).
In 1961, the statute contained the same text of the 1939 statute but was amended to
include the provision:
[Eixcept that such provision shall not apply to contractors who are each individ-
ually licensed under this chapter but who fail to comply with Section 7029.
Until the expiration of six months from the date of a suspension of a license
pursuant to Section 7068, the provisions of this section do not apply to any
person whose license was suspended pursuant to Section 7068 for failure to
notify the registrar within the 10-day period, if such failure was due to
inadvertence.
(ch. 1325, § 1, Stat. 3105-06 (1961)).
Finally, in 1965 the statute appeared in its present form.
17. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 282, 696 P.2d at 98, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
18. Id. One author states: "The licensing of the contractors in the building industry is
stated to be in the public interest to insure the public health and safety, and to prevent fraud
and subnormal workmanship by inexperienced and incapable contractors." W. SADLER,
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complish this objective by denying the noncomplying contractor ac-
cess to any court to recover compensation owed.19 The contractor
who is not properly licensed during the performance of a job runs
the very real risk of not being paid for work performed.
C. Development of Substantial Compliance Doctrine
In enforcing section 7031, courts attempt to reconcile two con-
flicting policies. On the one hand, the statute should be strictly en-
forced in order to protect the public from abuse by unqualified con-
tractors. On the other hand, strict enforcement could prevent an
innocent, though technically unlicensed contractor, from recovering
compensation for work performed. 0 As a result of these conflicting
policies, courts have not always agreed on how rigorously to inter-
pret the statute.
Citizens State Bank of Long Beach v. Gentry"5 is the first case
to apply the doctrine of substantial compliance to section 7031. In
this case, the contractor held a valid license when the contract was
executed and when the job began.22 While work was in progress, the
license expired.2" The contractor formed a corporation, which he
LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONSTRUCTION 13 (1959).
19. J. ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL (3d ed. 1982). The author
states: "The contractor who is not properly licensed at all times during the performance of a
job runs the risk on not being paid for his work. Moreover, the contractor who unwittingly
contracts with an unlicensed contractor may find himself precluded from recovering for work
performed." Id. at 142.
20. J. ACRET, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND
DISPUTES (2d ed. 1986). The author points out the conflict by stating that:
Rigid enforcement of [section 7031] has sometimes led to seemingly inequitable
results because an owner who has received the benefit of work properly per-
formed has nevertheless been able to escape payment on the ground that the
contractor was not properly licensed at all times. On the other hand, [section
70311 is a consumer protection statute that may require strict enforcement to
accomplish the desired results.
Id. at 19-20.
As to the question of why section 7031 should be strictly enforced, one court offered the
following reasoning: "In denying recovery to unlicensed contractors courts have rationalized
the harsh impact on some competent, but unlicensed, persons by deferring to the legislative
determination that deterrence outweighs the cumulative effect of the penalty suffered by the
contractor and the unjust enrichment obtained by the property owner." Executive Landscape
Corp. v. San Vincente Country Villas IV Ass'n, 145 Cal. App. 3d 496, 498, 193 Cal. Rptr.
377, 378 (1983).
21. 20 Cal. App. 2d 415, 67 P.2d 364 (1937). The court did not explicitly state that the
doctrine of substantial compliance was applied to section 7031, yet the case leaves little doubt
that this occurred.
22. Id. at 419, 67 P.2d at 366.
23. Id.
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owned and controlled, and the license was renewed in the name of
the corporation rather than in the name of the individual contrac-
tor."4 The contractor failed to strictly comply with section 7031 be-
cause he did not personally hold a valid license at all times during
performance of the contract. Nonetheless, a California court of ap-
peals held:
[W]here a manifestly unjust and inequitable result would follow
a holding that plaintiff contractor was without capacity to sue
on his contract, the individual plaintiff in whose name the li-
cense stood at the time the contract was made and the corporate
entity organized by him in whose name the license stood at the
time the cause of action accrued should be considered as one. 5
Citizens State Bank was followed by Gatti v. Highland Park
Builders, Inc.,26 in which the California Supreme Court applied the
doctrine of substantial compliance. Here, the individual contractor
held a valid license and entered into a building contract with the
defendant.27 All parties to the building contract later agreed that the
contractor and his foreman, who was also a licensed contractor,
would complete the balance of the work as partners. After full per-
formance by the partnership, a partnership license was issued to the
contractor, his foreman, and a third party. The defendant argued
that the failure of the contractor and his foreman to procure a sepa-
rate partnership license in their two names prevented them from re-
covering on the contract. The majority rejected this argument and
held that a reasonable interpretation of section 7031 "compels the
conclusion that plaintiffs have substantially complied with the statu-
tory requirements."2 The court reasoned that the partnership ar-
rangement did not effect any change in the performance of the con-
tract. 9 The court was also concerned that section 7031 not be used
as a shield to defeat a legitimate claim.
Although courts have found substantial compliance in some
cases, in others they have not. The following cases illustrate that sec-
tion 7031, at times, receives a strict interpretation.
For example, in Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons,30 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court failed to find substantial compliance. The de-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 420, 67 P.2d at 366-67.
26. 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265 (1946).
27. Id. at 688, 166 P.2d at 265.
28. Id. at 690, 166 P.2d at 266.
29. Id.
30. 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
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fendants entered into four separate agreements with the plaintiff
subcontractors who were not properly licensed. The court held that
the subcontractors could not maintain their action and recovery was
denied. 3 The court stated that:
Section 7031 represents a legislative determination that the im-
portance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the
contracting business outweighs any harshness between the par-
ties, and that such deterrence can best be realized by denying
violators the right to maintain any action for compensation in
the courts of the state. 2
Similarly, a court of appeals did not find substantial compliance
in Bierman v. Hagstrom Construction Co."3 because the subcontrac-
tor failed to renew his license for a period of five weeks during a ten
month job. 4 The subcontractor could not maintain an action against
the prime contractor for work done and materials used on a housing
project." The court distinguished this case from its predecessors
where substantial compliance was premised upon the basis that
someone had a license at all times during performance. In this case,
"there was a period of approximately five weeks when the plaintiff
was not licensed.""
A strict compliance approach was used to deny a partnership
recovery in Steinwinter v. Maxwell."7 The contractors entered into a
written contract with the defendant, however, only one of the con-
tractors was licensed. 8 Both contractors were officers of another cor-
poration that was duly licensed and both contractors had been ap-
proved by the licensing board for the issuance of the corporate
license.39 Nevertheless, the court found that "[tihe partners knew or
should have known, that they were required to have a contractor's
license. They had a valid license in their corporation which they
31. Id. at 154-55, 308 P.2d at 721-22. The court determined that the plaintiffs, as
subcontractors, acted as a contractor without being licensed as required by law. Id. at 147, 308
P.2d at 716.
32. Id. at 151, 308 P.2d at 719.
33. 176 Cal. App. 2d 771, 1 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1959).
34. Id. at 773-74, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 828. Due to an oversight, the license renewal fee was
not sent in on time. Id.
35. Id. at 776-77, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
36. d. at 777, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
37. 183 Cal. App. 2d 34, 6 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1960). The court determined that "Itihe
application of the substantial compliance rule has been limited to very few cases and we do not
feel that it should be extended to this case." Id. at 38, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 499.




could have used. For reasons unknown, they chose not to use it."40
In the above cases, the courts did not have a specific test to aid
them in making their decision as to whether substantial compliance
was present. It was not until 1966, when Latipac was decided, that
the California Supreme Court summarized the elements necessary
for a finding of substantial compliance.4
D. Latipac Inc. v. Superior Court
In Latipac, the plaintiff contracted to grade and fill certain land
owned by the defendant.42 The contractor possessed a valid license at
the time the parties executed the contract but later failed to submit a
renewal application and the required fee. The license expired, and at
the time of its expiration the contractor had been performing under
the contract for fifteen months. He completed the job and shortly
thereafter renewed his license.4 Defendant Latipac, Inc. sought to
restrain the court from hearing the action brought by the contractor
to recover for labor and materials furnished to the defendant pursu-
ant to the contract."
Justice Tobriner reaffirmed that the test is whether the contrac-
tor's substantial compliance with the licensing requirements satisfies
the policies of the statute.4 5 He then summarized the three elements
necessary to apply the doctrine:
(1) the fact that plaintiff held a valid license at the time of con-
tracting, (2) that plaintiff readily secured a renewal of that li-
cense, and (3) that the responsibility and competence of plain-
tiff's managing officer were officially confirmed throughout the
period of performance of the contract."
Justice Tobriner said the first element is important for several
40. Id. at 38, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
41. 64 Cal. 2d 278, 411 P.2d 564, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1966). For a brief review and
analysis of the Latipac decision, see Note, Substantial Compliance with Contractors Licensing
Statutes: Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 157 (1966); see also Com-
ment, New Interpretations of California's Contractors' License Law, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 298
(1967).
42. 64 Cal. 2d at 280, 411 P.2d at 566, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
43. Id. at 280, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679. The plaintiff had assigned the
responsibility of renewing the license to its office manager who later suffered an emotional
breakdown and was committed to a mental institution. The office manager had failed to renew
the license. Id. at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
44. Id. at 280, 411 P.2d at 566, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
45. Id. at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (quoting Lewis & Queen, 48 Cal.
2d at 149, 308 P.2d at 718 (1957)).
46. Latipac, 64 Cal. 2d at 281-82, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
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reasons. The presence of a license provides "official confirmation of
the contractor's responsibility and experience ' 47 and also "serves as a
basic determinant in the decision of prospective subcontractors and
other creditors as to whether to extend credit to the contractor.'
48
The second element is important since a renewal of a contractor's
license after a completion of performance "lends confirmation to [the
contractor's] continuing competence and responsibility during the pe-
riod of performance."" The idea is that the contractor's competence
and responsibility would be considered and confirmed when the li-
cense is renewed. The third element is important since "the fitness of
a corporation to enjoy a contractor's license lies in the competence
and experience of the individual who qualifies on its behalf" and a
corporate applicant may obtain a license by demonstrating that one
of its members possesses the requisite knowledge and experience."0
Latipac's unresolved question is illustrated by the opinion's dec-
laration that since all three elements were present, the court "need
not determine whether any of them, singly or in more limited combi-
nation, would constitute 'substantial compliance.'
E. Post-Latipac Cases
As mentioned earlier, the Latipac court did not indicate
whether any of the three elements, either by themselves or in some
limited combination, would constitute substantial compliance with
section 7031. Following the California Supreme Court's articulation
of the three elements, courts have been presented with cases request-
ing them to find substantial compliance. The following is a sampling
of some of the more important cases in which the Latipac test was
used.
All three Latipac elements were found to be present in Lewis v.
Arboles Development Co.," where the court said "the record shows
47. Id. at 282, 411 P.2d at 568, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 283, 411 P.2d at 569, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
50. Id. at 285, 411 P.2d at 570, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
51. Id. at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679. The actual language of the
opinion reads:
[Eixamination of the record reveals that the instant case presents each of the
elements upon which the courts have in the past relied for the application of the
doctrine of substantial compliance. Since all these elements here occur, we need
not determine whether any of them, singly or in more limited combination,
would constitute 'substantial compliance.'
Id.
52. 8 Cal. App. 3d 812, 87 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1970). The plaintiff, a licensed general
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substantial compliance as defined by Latipac. . . ."" Thus, the con-
tractor recovered compensation owed for the work he performed.
Frank v. Kozlovsky5" suggested that all three elements must be pre-
sent for a finding of substantial compliance. However, only the third
element was present so "[tihe requirements of Latipac [were] not
satisfied . ... 5
Substantial compliance was also found lacking in General In-
surance Co. of America v. Superior Court."6 The contractor went
bankrupt and his surety took over completion of the project. 7 A dis-
pute developed between the subcontractor and the surety and the
surety filed suit. Because the surety "was not licensed at the time it
executed the contract nor at any time during its performance" it was
precluded from proceeding against the defaulting subcontractor. "8
Two cases followed in which the courts failed to find substantial
compliance. In Weeks v. Merritt Building & Construction Co.," the
contractor was properly licensed and had performed 73% of the work
under the contract when he suffered a heart attack.60 He then relin-
quished all control over the contract to his unlicensed surety who
took over and performed the remainder of the work.6 The court
contractor, sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien against respondent. Plaintiff sued to recover
$43,834.78 due on a written contract for materials and labor expended in the installation of
drywall. Id. at 813, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
53. Id. at 817, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
54. 13 Cal. App. 3d 120, 91 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970). The plaintiffs had contracted with
defendants to build a nursery school. However, no application was made for a contractor's
license for the partnership until after the work was substantially finished. Id. at 121-22, 91
Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.
55. Id. at 125, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
56. 26 Cal. App. 3d 176, 102 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1972). This case provides a good general
discussion of case law concerning the evolution of the substantial compliance doctrine as ap-
plied to section 7031.
57. Id. at 178, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
58. Id. at 184, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 546. An examination of the case reveals that the first
Latipac element was not fulfilled while the remaining two were. The first element was not
fulfilled since "not only was plaintiff not duly licensed at the time the contract was executed, it
was not duly licensed at any time during its performance under the contract." Id. at 183, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 545. The second element was arguably fulfilled since the contractor "did apply
for and obtain a license a few months after completion of performance .. " Id. And the
third element was satisfied since "[tihe responsibility and competence of plaintiff's managing
officer were officially confirmed throughout the period of performance. ... Id. at 183, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 546.
The practical result of this decision is that sureties can, under appropriate circumstances,
act as contractors within the meaning of the statutory definition and therefore must prove that
they are duly licensed contractors in order to recover on contracts.
59. 39 Cal. App. 3d 520, 114 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1974).
60. Id. at 522-23, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 210-11.
61. Id.
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reasoned that "public policy would be circumvented if a licensed
contractor could contract, abrogate performance to an unlicensed
contractor and recover on the contract. '"62 The court also indicated
that the defendant did not receive the full protection which the stat-
ute contemplates.6" In the second case, Rushing v. Powell,64 a con-
tractor licensed as a swimming pool contractor lent his name to a
business venture that enabled the plaintiff to obtain a license to con-
struct swimming pools without having to demonstrate the requisite
skill in that field." In denying recovery, the court said the arrange-
ment "permitted the plaintiff in substance to engage in a specialty in
which he had not demonstrated qualification by taking and passing
the appropriate examination and for which he had not been licensed
as an individual. .... 66
The Latipac test was used in Airfloor Co. of California, Inc. v.
Regents of Univ. of California.61 This case involved a contractor
who was licensed when the contract was executed and remained li-
censed during the entire time he performed the contract except for
one month." The court determined that all Latipac elements were
fulfilled.69
Soon thereafter, a court of appeals determined that one out of
three Latipac elements was not sufficient for a finding of substantial
compliance. In Brown v. Solano County Business Development,
Inc., o the contractor was licensed at the time of contracting and at
the time he began performance. After a brief initial period of per-
62. Id. at 524, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
63. Id. at 525, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
64. 61 Cal. App. 3d 597, 130 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976).
65. Id. at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
66. Id. A contractor who performs work in a specialty in which he has no license rims
the risk of not receiving compensation for that work. In Currie v. Stolowitz, the contractor had
a heating, ventilating, and air conditioning license, but no plumbing license. 169 Cal. App. 2d
810, 338 P.2d 208 (1959). He agreed to perform all heating, ventilating, air conditioning and
plumbing work and later subcontracted out the plumbing work. Id. at 812, 338 P.2d at 210.
The subcontractor started the work and then refused to perform anymore. The contractor then
completed the work (including the plumbing). The court held that the contractor could not
recover since he had performed work outside his specialty. Id.
67. 84 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 149 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1978).
68. Id. at 1009-10, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
69. Id. at 1010, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The court stated that first, the contractor "was
licensed when the contract was executed and remained licensed for the entire time it performed
the contract except for the last month." Second, the application for license renewal, "though
defective, was made before the license expired." Third, the court reasoned that since an arbi-
tration board awarded the contractor compensation the obligator must have been satisfied with
the quality of work performed. Id.
70. 92 Cal. App. 3d 192, 154 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1979).
[Vol. 28
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
formance the license expired, and during the next six and one-half
months, he worked on the project without a license.7 ' He then filed
suit to recover money owed him. 72 In denying recovery, the court
said the plaintiff proved only the first Latipac element and therefore
had not substantially complied with section 7031. a
Roy Brothers Drilling Co. v. Jones7 4 involved a contractor who
was denied the right to recover for work performed outside his spe-
cialty.75 The plaintiff drilled caisson holes and performed excavation
work for the foundation of the defendant's residence.7 ' The contrac-
tor held a license that only authorized him to install sanitation sys-
tems. The court reasoned that because the defendants were not af-
forded the protection contemplated by section 7031, the contractor
could not recover.
The issue presented in Gaines v. Eastern Pacific7s was whether
the contractor was barred from recovery because he did not have a
license at the time the contract was entered into. The court found
that although the contractor was unlicensed during the first month of
the contract he could recover.79 The court noted the contractor "was
not called upon to perform any contracting services . . ." during that
time and that by the time the services were performed he had been
licensed for approximately four months."0
Finally, two recent cases interpreting section 7031 should be of
considerable interest to individuals in the construction industry. One
is the California Supreme Court decision, Asdourian v. Arajs1 and
the other is the Second District Court of Appeals decision, Knapp
Development & Design v. Pal-Mal Properties, Ltd."2
71. Id. at 194, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 702. The first element was proven since he possessed a
valid contractor's license at the time of contracting, and during a brief initial period of per-
formance. Id. The second element was not proven since the record showed that the contractor
had failed to readily secure renewal of his license. Id. The third element was not proven since
the construction was performed without the assistance, supervision and expertise of a licensed
contractor. Id.
74. 123 Cal. App. 3d 175, 176 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1981).
75. Id. at 187, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
76. Id. at 178, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
77. Id. at 187, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
78. 136 Cal. App. 3d 679, 186 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1982).
79. Id. at 682-83, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 423-24.
80. Id. at 682, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
81. 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1985). The court's decision is
analyzed in Note, Business and Professions, California Supreme Court Survey, March 1985-
May 1985, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 209 (1985).
82. 173 Cal. App. 3d 423, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1985). This is the most recent significant
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The California Supreme Court equitably applied section 7031
in Asdourian. The contractor passed an examination and obtained a
license issued in the name of "Artko Remodeling and Construc-
tion."8 He then entered into three separate remodeling contracts
with the defendant and later brought an action to enforce the con-
tracts. The California Supreme Court heard the case and said that
although the plaintiff contractor was not "duly" licensed because the
license was not in his own name, a license would not have provided
the defendant with any greater assurance of competence.84 The court
noted that "[t]o allow the defendant to prevail on a technicality
would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a 'shield for the avoid-
ance of a just obligation.' " The court appeared to be relaxing the
stringency of the elements. The first element was considered unim-
portant since the plaintiff contractor's firm held a valid license and
the license "provided sufficient evidence of plaintiffs qualification. '"88
The second element was considered irrelevant since "[tihere was no
period during which plaintiffs business was not licensed, nor was
there any change in the form of the business from the time the li-
cense was issued."8 The third element was fulfilled since the compe-
tence and experience of the contractor formed the basis of the license
issued to Artko.8a
The most recent case of importance to interpret section 7031 is
Knapp. 9 A court of appeals held that the contractor had substan-
tially complied, although most of the requirements essential for a
finding of substantial compliance were absent. The case involved a
rather complex fact pattern.9"
case to interpret section 7031 as this comment goes to print.
83. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 279, 696 P.2d at 97, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
84. Id. at 285, 696 P.2d at 100-01, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
85. Id. at 289, 696 P.2d at 103, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (quoting Latipac, 64 Cal. 2d
278, 281, 411 P.2d 564, 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676, 679 (1966)); Gatti, 27 Cal. 2d 687, 690, 166
P.2d 265, 266 (1946).
86. Asdourian, at 285, 696 P.2d at 100, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
87. Id. at 285, 696 P.2d at 101, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
88. Id. at 286, 696 P.2d at 101, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
89. 173 Cal. App. 3d 423, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1985).
90. Joan Knapp was president and principal shareholder of plaintiff contractor, and had
been licensed for over seventeen years. Id. at 427, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The plaintiff corpora-
tion applied for a license after the project in controversy was completed, and after the contro-
versy resulting in the filing of a lawsuit. Id. Joan Knapp was also a general partner and
principal owner of a limited partnership which, as owner, entered into a construction contract
with plaintiff unlicensed contractor for the construction of an office complex. Id. at 427, 219
Cal. Rptr. at 45-46. A dispute arose and plaintiff contractor recorded a mechanic's lien on the
property and sought a foreclosure. Intervenors purchased the property at a prior foreclosure
sale and obtained a judgment that the lien was invalid because the plaintiff corporation was
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The Knapp court considered the three Latipac elements and
reached the following conclusions. Because the plaintiff did not hold
a contractor's license at the time of contracting or during perform-
ance, the plaintiff therefore had "not met the first element of the test
for substantial compliance.""' However, the court said that this ele-
ment had far less importance here since the contractor represented
both parties to the contract and was also the managing partner or
officer of both entities thus "there was no problem of the other party
to the contract being misled as to the responsibility or competence of
the contractor due to unawareness of the contractor's unlicensed sta-
tus."92 The court then found that the second Latipac element had
not been fulfilled since the contractor did not apply for a license until
after performance had been completed and the lawsuit filed.9" Fi-
nally, the court found that "the third element of the test for substan-
tial compliance [had] been met"9 because the responsibility and
competence of plaintiff's responsible managing officer was officially
confirmed by Joan Knapp's continued licensing.
Because of the numerous cases following Latipac, it is necessary
to explore the utility of its test.
III. PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH
The current approach used by the courts to determine whether
a contractor substantially complies with section 7031 asks whether
the contractor's substantial compliance with the licensing require-
ments satisfies the policy of the statute.9" The courts make this deter-
mination by examining whether the three Latipac elements are pre-
sent in the case under consideration. A problem arises in that the
California Supreme Court has not indicated under which circum-
stances a showing of less than all three Latipac elements may suffice
for a finding of substantial compliance.
To briefly illustrate this point, Knapp is helpful." The major-
ity found. that the subcontractor substantially complied with section
7031 even though most of the Latipac elements were lacking. At
least one and arguably two of the three Latipac elements were not
not licensed. Id. at 427-28, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
91. Id. at 432, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49.
92. Id. at 432, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Latipac, 64 Cal. 2d at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (quoting Lewis &
Queen, 48 Cal. 2d at 149, 308 P.2d at 718).
96. 173 Cal. App. 3d 423, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1985).
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present in this case, nonetheless substantial compliance was found. 7
Another recent case which states all three Latipac elements need not
be present is Asdourian." Only two of the three Latipac elements
were present yet substantial compliance was found. These two cases
suggest that if the policies of section 7031 are satisfied then all three
Latipac elements need not necessarily be present for a finding of
substantial compliance.
Various California courts have reiterated that the ultimate pur-
pose of section 7031 is to protect the public." Courts have also noted
that another purpose of section 7031 is to "practically enforce the
Contractors License Law."1° If a new approach is able to satisfy
these purposes, and accomplish them in a more efficient manner than
the method currently used, it should be examined. This comment
next analyzes how the three Latipac elements have been interpreted
by the courts so far. This comment will then suggest a new approach
for determining substantial compliance with section 7031.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Element One: Plaintiff Holds Valid License at Time of
Contracting
1. Purpose
This element is said to serve two purposes. The license serves as
official confirmation of the contractor's responsibility, competency
and experience. T0 The license also aids prospective subcontractors




This element appears on its face to be unambiguous. Both the
language of the element and logic suggest that a contractor must be
properly licensed on the date the building contract is entered into.
a. Contractor Possesses License at Time of Contracting
The easiest way to satisfy this element is for the contractor who
97. Id. at 436, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
98. 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1985).
99. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 46-47.
102. See supra notes 47-48.
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performs the work to possess a valid license on the date the building
contract is entered into. Several cases demonstrate how contractors
have satisfied this element by doing just this. In Lewis, the respon-
dents admitted that the contractor was licensed for approximately ten
months during the performance of the contract. The element was
satisfied because at the time of contracting the contractor was prop-
erly licensed. 1 3 Similarly, in Airfloor, the contractor was licensed
when the contract was executed and remained licensed for the entire
time he performed the contract except for the last month. '0 Finally,
in Brown, the contractor involved in the construction of a shopping
center development possessed a valid license at the time of con-
tracting and during a brief initial period of performance." 5
In all three cases, the contractor performing the work possessed
his own valid license at the moment the building contract was en-
tered into. This is the easiest manner for a contractor to satisfy this
element.
b. Contractor Does Not Possess License at the Time of
Contracting: Element One Not Satisfied
Another group of cases fall into a different category. In these
cases the contractor who performed the work failed to hold a valid
license at the time the parties entered into the building contract. In
each instance the court refused to find the first Latipac element satis-
fied. One representative example is Frank."6 None of the contrac-
tors associated with the construction of a nursery school were li-
censed: the partnership which performed the work had no license,
the qualifying partner did not possess a license, and the second part-
ner had an inactive license for masonry contracting and none for
general contracting. Moreover, the new partnership conducted busi-
ness under a different name and never sought a license. Another ex-
ample is General Insurance Co.10 7 The contractor who performed
construction work on a mobile home park was not licensed at the
time the written contract was entered into nor at the time the work
was performed, and he failed to obtain a license until several months
after the project was completed. As a result, the court refused to
foreclose a mechanic's lien and refused to allow recovery on a pay-
103. Lewis, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
104. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
105. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 194, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
106. 13 Cal. App. 3d 120, 91 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970).
107. 26 Cal. App. 3d 176, 102 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1972).
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ment bond.' 0 8
Other courts also require a contractor to possess a valid license
at contracting time. In Weeks,' 09 the court stated that "the person
who performs the contract must have the required license, not the
person who happens to have a right to maintain a suit for money
owed under the contract." 1 The surety company that took over for
the contractor lost over $37,400.00."' The contractor in Rushing"2
was licensed at the time of contracting but the license was gained
through an impermissible arrangement and therefore rendered a nul-
lity. Finally, in Roy Brothers Drilling Co.,"' no person connected
with the contractor had at any time been duly licensed to perform
the work so recovery was not allowed.
All five cases demonstrate that courts, at times, insist that the
contractor who actually performs the work be properly licensed at
the time an agreement is entered into. The problematic result is that
a contractor may not recover for work performed even when the
work is performed satisfactorily and even when the other party may
be unjustly enriched.
c. Contractor Does Not Possess License at the Time of
Contracting: Element One Satisfied Anyway
Of special interest to this comment are the Gaines, Asdourian,
and Knapp cases. In these cases the contracting entity was not prop-
erly licensed at the time of contracting yet substantial compliance
was found. An examination of these cases reveals that courts may
seek to avoid an inequitable result which could arise from a stringent
application of the first Latipac element.
In Gaines,"4 the contractor did not possess a valid license at the
time the contract was entered into and during the first month the
contract became effective." 5 The court noted that during the one
month period the contractor was not called upon to perform any con-
tracting services, the inference being that if a contractor was licensed
when actual performance began there could be substantial
108. Id. at 184-85, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
109. 39 Cal. App. 3d 520, 114 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1974).
110. Id. at 524, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
111. Id. at 524-25, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13.
112. 61 Cal. App. 3d 597, 130 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976).
113. 123 Cal. App. 3d 175, 176 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1981).
114. 136 Cal. App. 3d 679, 186 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1982).




Next, in Asdourian,"I the contractor seeking recovery was not
duly licensed in his own name but the contractor's corporation held a
valid license at the time of contracting. The California Supreme
Court concluded that the license issued to the corporation provided
sufficient evidence of the contractor's qualifications. " 8 Here, as in
Gaines, the court was more concerned with an equitable result
rather than a strict interpretation of the element.
Finally, in Knapp,"9 the contractor did not hold a valid license
at the time of contracting nor at any time during performance. How-
ever, the court determined that the element had far less importance
in this case than in others because the contractor represented both
parties to the contract.'2 The contractor was the managing officer or
partner of both entities so there was no chance that the other con-
tracting party would be misled as to the competence and responsibil-
ity of the contractor.' 2 '
B. Element Two: Plaintiff Readily Secured a Renewal of Its
License
1. Purpose
This element is said to serve an important purpose. That is, the
renewal of a license after completion of performance lends confirma-
tion of the contractor's continuing competence and responsibility
during the period of performance.'22
2. Analysis
The idea underlying this element is that a contractor who ob-
tains a license renewal has been judged to be competent and respon-
116. Id. The Gaines court relied on Vitek, 34 Cal. App. 3d 586, 110 Cal. Rptr. 86(1973). In Vitek, the general contractor and a corporation negotiated for the construction of an
ice skating rink. A written contract was formally executed late Friday afternoon, October 25,
1968, and on October 28, 1968 the contractor's license was renewed. On October 28, 1968 the
contractor made its first payment under the contract and work began. Id. at 588, 110 Cal.
Rptr. at 87-88. The court determined that "[ijt is unnecessary in the case before us to resort to
this doctrine (substantial compliance), however, since there is substantial evidence (the contrac-
tor) began and completed all work after it acquired the license on October 28, 1968." Id. at
590, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
117. 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1985).
118. Id. at 298-99, 696 P.2d at 110, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
119. 173 Cal. App. 3d 423, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1985).
120. Id. at 432, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
121. Id. at 434, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
122. See supra note 49.
1988]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
sible, otherwise, the State Contractors License Board would not re-
new the license. If the board determines that the particular
contractor is incompetent or irresponsible, it would simply refuse to
renew the license.
a. Contractor Did Not Renew License on Time
There are several cases in which various courts have determined
that the second Latipac element is satisfied even though it was not
strictly complied with. One case is Lewis"12 where the court said the
element was fulfilled because there was nothing in the declarations
or the record which showed that the contractor failed to apply for a
renewal of his license. Strict compliance with the element was also
lacking in General Insurance Co." 4 The contractor applied for and
obtained a license several months after the project was completed;
technically, he did not renew his license during the performance of
the contract."28 Despite this fact the court determined that the ele-
ment was satisfied and implicitly suggested that if a contractor at-
tempts to renew the license, even after completion of a project, then
compliance with the element may still occur.
Finally, the Airfloor court said that "[a]pplication for license
renewal, though defective, was made before the license expired." '26
The majority emphasized that the renewal was sought before the
license expired.' Also of significance was that the State Contractors
License Board notified the contractor that if he resubmitted a proper
application, a license would issue. 28 This case implied that the sec-
ond Latipac element can be satisfied if a contractor makes a good
faith attempt to comply.
b. Original Contractor Must Renew License
Several other cases required the original contractor to renew its
original license in order to satisfy the element. One case illustrating
this point is Frank. 29 Here, two contractors obtained an entirely
new license for a partnership which was not the one that originally
entered into the contract.' The court indicated that the element was
123. 8 Cal. App. 3d 817, 87 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1970).
124. 26 Cal. App. 3d 176, 102 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1972).
125. Id. at 178, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
126. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 13 Cal. App. 3d 120, 91 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970).
130. Id. at 122-23, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.
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not satisfied since no renewal of the original license was sought." 1
In Brown, the record established that "appellant did not 'read-
ily' secure a renewal of his license."' 2 Thus the contractors license
board did not have the opportunity to review his qualifications.
c. Recent Cases to Interpret Element Two
Recent case law suggests that courts are willing to relax the
stringency of this element. In Asdourian, the court decided that the
element was irrelevant since "[tlhere was no period during which
plaintiff's business was not licensed, nor was there any change in the
form of the business from the time the license was issued."'33 And in
Knapp,'" the element was not satisfied because the contractor failed
to apply for a license until performance had been completed and the
lawsuit filed, yet substantial compliance was found. "'
C. Element Three: Responsibility and Competence of Plaintiff's
Managing Officer Officially Confirmed Throughout the Period of
Performance of the Contract
1. Purpose
This element is considered essential since it is said the fitness of
a corporation to enjoy a contractor's license lies in the competence
and experience of the individual who qualifies on its behalf." 6
2. Analysis
In determining whether this element is present, courts begin by
determining who is the "responsible managing officer." In some
cases, the individual contractor is considered the responsible manag-
ing officer. In other cases, an individual associated with the contrac-
tor's business, usually a supervising employee, fits this description.
The easiest way for a contractor to fulfill this element is to person-
ally perform the work required by the contract. Instead, the contrac-
tor may supervise the performance of the work required under the
131. Id. at 124-25, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
132. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
133. 38 Cal. 3d at 285, 696 P.2d at 101, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
134. 173 Cal. App. 3d 423, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1985).
135. Id. at 436, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
136. Latipac, 64 Cal. 2d at 278, 411 P.2d at 564, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 676. The majority
determined that "[tihe pattern of [section 70311 evinces a legislative determination that the
fitness of a corporation to enjoy a contractor's license lies in the competence and experience of
the individual who qualifies on its behalf." Id. at 285, 411 P.2d at 570, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
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contract while being properly licensed. 8" Another way for a contrac-
tor to fulfill this element is for the "responsible managing officer" to
be a "responsible managing officer" of another corporation which is
licensed. Case law shows examples of this occurring. 
8
A separate way to satisfy this element is to ensure that a super-
vising employee who is intimately involved with the construction
project possess a valid license. However, an improperly licensed em-
ployee who performs work without assistance, supervision and ex-
pertise of a licensed contractor will not satisfy this element. This
point was illustrated in Brown.139 The court was concerned that
some licensed individual be involved in the performance of the
contract.
In short, case law demonstrates that someone intimately in-
volved in the performance of the building contract must be properly
licensed. The courts are likely to find this element satisfied if the
individual contractor is properly licensed. But courts have also
shown that if some responsible party is properly licensed, then the
element can be satisfied.
V. PROPOSAL
This portion of the comment suggests a new approach to guide
courts in determining whether a contractor has substantially com-
plied with the requirements of section 7031. Specifically, a modifica-
tion of the Latipac test is proposed. This new approach would limit
the complexities and uncertainties inherent in the current approach
which requires courts to determine whether the three Latipac ele-
ments are present and satisfied.
The proposed test is simple both in form and application. In-
stead of determining whether all three Latipac elements are present,
or that some are present and others are lacking, this approach in-
stead asks: (1) whether the contractor or a responsible managing of-
ficer of the contractor was licensed at the time the building agree-
ment was signed, or at least before the actual work began (this is a
modification of the first Latipac element); and (2) whether the re-
sponsibility and competence of the contractor's managing officer was
officially confirmed throughout the period of performance of the
137. See supra note 96.
138. In Latipac, for example, the responsible managing officer of the employer was,
during the entire progress of the job, also the responsible managing officer of another corpora-
tion. 64 Cal. 2d at 285-86, 411 P.2d at 570, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
139. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
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building agreement (this is the third Latipac element). If the con-
tractor fulfills these two elements, then substantial compliance with
section 7031 is present. If the elements are not fulfilled, then section
7031 has not been substantially complied with and the contractor
would not be allowed access to the courts to recover compensation
owed. By using this approach the courts would no longer need to
further dilute the Latipac elements.
The modification of the first Latipac element would take into
account the findings of Gaines, Asdourian, and Knapp. The whole-
sale elimination of the second Latipac element would not be detri-
mental. There already exists an adequate enough incentive for con-
tractors to renew their licenses apart from mandating that it be done
as a prerequisite for finding substantial compliance with section
7031. Contractors who fail to renew their license in a timely fashion
run the risk of losing business because most individuals and entities
that enter into building agreements require verification or some other
affirmation that the contractor is properly licensed and able to per-
form the work.
Retention of the third Latipac element in its present form and
as currently interpreted is desirable. Contractors would be en-
couraged to ensure that the person(s) performing or supervising the
work are qualified.
Several other advantages would also occur if this new approach
is adopted. Judicial economy would be enhanced because fewer cases
would need to be heard. In addition, as long as the Latipac elements
continue to be used, courts will on occasion be sorely tempted to
stretch the facts of a case in order to find substantial compliance.
Finally, an innocent, yet technically unlicensed contractor may be
able to recover compensation for services rendered and materials fur-
nished to other parties, thereby preventing unjust enrichment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Before Latipac was decided, courts determined whether section
7031 was substantially complied with on an ad hoc, case-by-case ba-
sis. In 1966, Latipac held that a contractor substantially complies
with section 7031 when three elements were satisfied. Following La-
tipac, courts have had at their disposal a test to aid them in making
their determination. Applying the Latipac elements has enabled
courts to allow a contractor to recover compensation owed despite
non-strict compliance with section 7031. However, the current prob-
lem is whether a showing of less than all three elements is sufficient
for a finding of substantial compliance. Recent case law shows that
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not all three requirements need be satisfied. Moreover, recent case
law demonstrates that the stringency of the elements have been re-
laxed to such an extent so as to merely serve as indicia of whether
substantial compliance is present.
This comment argues that the Latipac test should be modified
to reflect the current realities of how the elements have been inter-
preted. As noted by the California Supreme Court in Asdourian, it
has been almost five decades since the doctrine was first applied. 4"
The Legislature has not manifested any disapproval during this time
period. Consequently, California Business and Profession Code sec-
tion 7031 continues to be interpreted in a manner which allows
courts to prevent unjust enrichment, and provides ample room for
modification such as suggested by this comment.
Michael J. Smith
140. Knapp, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 436, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 51. The court noted that the
doctrine of substantial compliance is well established in the decisional law of California.
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